Secure Comms & Signal Reality: Building for the Way It Works
The recent story from The Atlantic is a wild one. A journalist was accidentally added to a Signal group chat where senior U.S. officials—including the Vice President , Secretary of State , and others—allegedly coordinated real-time military strikes .
Let that sink in.
No SCIF. No SIPR. Not even a DODIN Teams call.
Just Signal Messenger.
The journalist said nothing, waiting to see what it was about. Then the bombs fell. 
Read the full article
You could call it reckless. You could call it illegal or a clear OPSEC violation.
You could also call it a common reality .
TLDR: Don’t Just Say “Don’t Use It”
When ops go to Signal, the answer isn’t just “Don’t do that.”
The answer is: We get it. Here’s how to do it safer.
So:
• If you’re coordinating in Signal anyway—structure it
• If you’re worried about trust—build processes for it
• If you think tools like this will keep getting used—plan for it
• And if you want to build a better tool—let’s talk
We’re not advocating for reckless behavior.
We’re advocating for resilience , realism , and responsibility .
Because it’s already happening, let’s build systems that know that—and work anyway.
IrregularChat Has Been Living This Reality for Years
We’re not a federal agency, we’re not on JWICS, and we’re not rolling out CAC authentication or enforcing proper DODIN routing.
But we are coordinating thousands of people from across services, ranks, sectors, and orgs today—and doing it securely on platforms like Signal .
We’ve had to figure out what works without official infrastructure. And here’s the thing: it does work—with process, structure, and intention.
Reference: Our community framework → Building Communities Forum Post
What We’ve Built (That Others Can Learn From)
If you’re using Signal for ops, coordination, or community or are forced to use it because other systems aren’t viable, this is your playbook .
Identity, Verification & Onboarding
• Human-based identity checks using trusted introductions (no CAC or .gov required)
• Structured onboarding into action channels for visibility and audit logs
• Bonafide intros: name, org, who added you, and interests to shape chat access
Safety Number Protocols & Trust Restoration
• Safety number change detection triggers auto-prompted re-verification
• 24-hour response window before temporary removal
• Audit trail maintained in a mod-only log channel
Admin Dashboard
• Built with Cloudflare Identity-Aware Proxy for secure, non-centralized access
• Non-technical admins can add users, check histories, assign roles, and more
• Avoids Authentik or IdM access for basic admin workflows
Engagement Automation
• Pre-created accounts with first-login welcome messages → drastically higher activation
• Signal chat links + wiki access (for knowledge management)+ dashboard setup in one step
Off-topic, Political, & Disruption Management
• Clear guidance on keeping chats focused (Signal isn’t Slack—single-threaded chaos)
• Redirects to off-topic or political channels with soft nudging and private DM invites
• Escalation protocols for disruptive behavior (not just kick, but documentation)
Bottom line:
We’ve already built systems that work in Signal , at scale , with verification , without central command .
When the “Right” Way Clashes With the Only Way That Work
Using Signal isn’t the plan. It’s the fallback. It’s the “what’s already installed.”
It’s the tool that gets opened when:
• MS Teams doesn’t work because you’re not on the exemplary NIPR/SIPR instance
• Wickr feels like shouting into a cave with three other people in it
• SIPR doesn’t include press, contractors, or interagency partners
• JWICS is not accessible , even to those who technically need it
• And everyone in your group is under pressure to coordinate now
This is not ideal.
But we do think you can plan around it instead of pretending it’s not happening .
What Would a Government-Grade Signal Look Like?
It’s not a dream. It’s a real design challenge—and the building blocks already exist.
There’s a path to evolve Signal or similar E2EE platforms into a communications system that meets government-grade expectations. The goal? Combine the usability people reach for under pressure with the accountability and control required for national security.
Let’s break down what a modern, resilient, real-world-ready, secure messenger could include:
Accountability Without Central Control
• Auditable Identity Linking : Users’ cryptographic keys can be tethered to verifiable identifiers like social accounts or trusted reputation systems—similar to what platforms like Keybase once offered. This would enable soft identity checks and community trust ratings without enforcing rigid, centralized credentials.
• Traceable Abuse Control : Protocols like Dissent (Corrigan-Gibbs & Ford) and Cerberus (Pattison & Hopper) show how accountability can coexist with anonymity. For example:
• Dissent enables anonymity with group-level traceability when bad actors arise.
• Cerberus requires consensus among moderators to deanonymize users—preventing unilateral abuse of mod powers.
• Message Source Tracking : Rather than logging everything, message tracing mechanisms (Peale et al.) enable privacy-preserving attribution. That means misconduct can be tracked back without exposing unrelated user activity.
Data Persistence That Preserves Privacy
Signal isn’t designed for message recovery. But new designs can do both without compromising encryption:
• Sync Across Devices : Source-tracking and peer-to-peer sync methods allow messages and key material to move securely between a user’s devices without exposing them to the platform.
• Selective Retention : Persistence doesn’t have to mean surveillance. The right system would preserve mission-critical threads (for audit or FOIA compliance) while maintaining ephemeral defaults for everyday chat.
• Archivable by Policy, Not Default : Sensitive channels could allow opt-in or admin-triggered backups (e.g., to agency cloud or encrypted archive)—an option Signal doesn’t natively support.
Sensible Defaults and Security Automation
Most operational security failures happen not because encryption is broken but because users make mistakes. Here’s how to reduce that risk:
• Privacy by Default : Implement settings where users don’t need to manually manage safety numbers, encryption modes, or contact verifications. Systems like Pretty Easy Privacy (pEp) automate these decisions while ensuring high-grade protection.
• Zero-Conf Key Exchange : Remove the need for clunky QR scans or manual fingerprint comparisons. Instead, use a social-graph trust or automated out-of-band verification to simplify onboarding.
• Dynamic Access Control : Combine ephemeral chats with multi-party admin models—so no one person can destroy a room or abuse moderator rights, and escalation paths are clear.
Moderation That Matches Reality
Moderation in Signal today is adding, removing, or hoping for the best.
A better system would allow for:
• Democratically Controlled Mod Powers : Instead of one sysadmin, a quorum of moderators could control key group actions—like user removal, chat retention, or sensitive ID reveals.
• Action Logs and Transparency Layers : Rather than disappearing messages with no trace, enable internal logs or anonymized mod actions to maintain community accountability.
Bridging the Gap—Literally
Here’s the next step:
Instead of expecting users to abandon Signal, we bridge to tools that offer:
• Dashboards for admins
• Interfaces for archives and retention (where needed)
• Lightweight identity layers
• Message-level reporting and abuse tooling
• Federated community interoperability
This doesn’t require replacing Signal—it means building on or alongside it , just like we’ve already done in IrregularChat.
We’re not advocating for reckless behavior.
We’re advocating for resilience , realism , and responsibility .
Because it’s already happening, let’s build systems that know that—and work anyway.
Forum admins & mod tools in active development and open source.